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Harry H. Wellingtont
Few would want to deny what the Supreme Court declared in NLRB
v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.': The literal ban of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), § 8(b)(1)(A), 2 on union attempts to
"restrain or coerce" employees does not prohibit a union from
disciplining its members. "Integral to . . . federal labor policy," said
the Court, "has been the power in the chosen union to protect against
erosion its status under that policy through reasonable discipline of
members who violate rules and regulations governing membership."3
The traditional forms of union discipline are suspension and ex-
pulsion. These sanctions are appropriately described as "internal,"
for they involve no more than loss of union membership. In con-
trast to such permissible internal sanctions are impermissible job dis-
criminations: a union is prohibited from disciplining a member for
offenses against the organization by attempting to cause the employer
to penalize him in any way.4 So long as a worker pays his union dues
as required by a union security clause, his employment rights theoret-
ically are safe from union interference.5
* Some portions of this article were presented in a different form at the Frank W.
Pierce Memorial Conference at Cornell University, November 16-17, 1973. I am very
grateful to Mr. Peter T. Grossi, Jr., J.D. Yale, 1973, and Mr. Albert G. Lauber, Jr., of
the third-year class at the Yale Law School for their able assistance (at different stages)
in the preparation of this article.
t Dean and Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
[NLRA § 7]: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein ....
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), guarantees to employees the right to organize and
engage in "other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection," and also the right to refrain from such activities.
The Allis-Chalmers Court did not rely on the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A); it focused instead
on the legislative history of the phrase "restrain or coerce." 388 U.S. at 178-87.
3. 388 U.S. at 181.
4. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to encourage or discourage membership in a labor union "by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment."
NLRA § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
"to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in viola-
tion of [§ 8(a)(3)]."
5. A proviso to § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA permits an employer to negotiate a union
security clause as part of the collective agreement, requiring workers to join the union
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The problem with Allis-Chalmers is not its approval of union dis-
cipline, but its exposition of the forms that union discipline may
take. Allis-Chalmers held that a union may punish strikebreaking
members not only by suspension or expulsion, but also by monetary
fines. Further, the Court held that a union may enforce its fines not
only through suspension or expulsion, but also through the judicial
process.6 The Allis-Chalmers Court saw itself as preserving the grand
dichotomy between internal union sanctions and impermissible job
discriminations.7 Whether it did so is questionable. It is difficult
to see how a union is proceeding "internally" when it hauls the ac-
cused from a union hearing into a court of law. Nor is it obvious
-and this is the important point-that a union leaves a worker's em-
ployment rights inviolate when it exacts a portion of his paycheck
in satisfaction of a fine imposed for working.
Since 1967, Allis-Chalmers has bedeviled the law of union discipline.
Court enforceability of union fines has inhibited the assertion, and
jeopardized the vindication, of workers' rights. The recent history of
union discipline litigation has been a series of footnotes to Allis-
Chalmers. To my mind, the text should be rewritten. The decision
was close (five to four), and the Court's reasoning weak. Yet so long as
it remains the law, these subsequent footnotes merit examination. For
buried among them is a doctrine which promises the dissident some
relief: Although a worker may have to continue paying dues, he can
immunize himself from union fines by resigning his union member-
ship. This doctrine is probably little known to those who stand to
profit from it. Indeed, since Allis-Chalmers the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB) and the Court have made it difficult for lawyers
as well as laymen to define the rights of the individual worker.
I. The Extent of Union Discipline
Before examining the Court's present attitude toward union fines
and the worker's realistic chances of avoiding them, a preliminary
survey of the scope of union discipline will indicate the extent of the
individual's vulnerability. Unions have the power to discipline their
within a month after their employment begins. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). But the
Court held in NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), that an employee's
obligations under a union security clause are limited to payment of union dues and
initiation fees. See pp. 1048-51 & note 138 infra. Section 8 (b)(2) denies a union the power
to compel an employer to discharge a worker for any reason other than the worker's
failure "to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(2) (1970).
6. 388 U.S. at 179, 192-93.
7. See id. at 185-86, 195.
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members for a wide range of transgressions.8 Both common and statu-
tory law, however, have been concerned with curtailing this power
when it is used to interfere with democracy within the organization. 9
Substantive and procedural limitations restrict the union's authority in
areas of direct interest to us here. Unfortunately, in detailing these
limitations the Court and the Board have shown little consistency and
less conviction. The substantive limitations on union authority must
be clarified so that each individual may know the measure of his
vulnerability. The procedural limitations on union authority must
be enhanced so that union disciplinary procedures may recognize and
fully safeguard the rights of the dissident member.
A. Substantive Limitations on Union Discipline
Substantive limitations on union power have evolved under the
rubric of a "public policy" -exception to union disciplinary authority.
As might be expected, therefore, the limitations lack definition: the
NLRB retains a great deal of discretion in passing on the legitimacy
of union disciplinary action.
The public policy exception developed from decisions upholding
individual members' access to the NLRB. In two companion cases,
H. B. Roberts ° and Local 138, 1UOE (Charles S. Skura),n the Board
held that a union could not discipline a member for filing an unfair
labor practice charge before he had exhausted his internal union
remedies. The Board in Skura distinguished its approval of the fines
for strikebreaking in A llis-Chalmers by explaining that the union rule
in Allis-Chalmers contravened no "recognized public policies."' 2 In
contrast it noted:
By the rule under consideration here, however, [the union] at-
tempted to regulate its members' access to the Board's processes.
Considering the overriding public interest involved, it is our
8. The following is a representative list of cases upholding union discipline for various
"internal" offenses: Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969) (exceeding production quotas);
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967) (strikebreaking); Reyes v. Laborers'
Local 16, 464 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 915 (1973) (threatening
union officials with violence); Rocket Freight Lines v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 202 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970) (reporting for work after local but before international
ratification of new contract); Glasser v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1968) (working with
nonunion employees); Local 5795, Communications Workers, 192 N.L.R.B. 556, 77
L.R.R.M. 1827 (1971) (reporting a co-worker for drinking on job in violation of union
rule against informing); Teamsters Local 70, 191 N.L.R.B. 227, 77 L.R.R.M. 1415 (1971)
(splitting vacations to please employer in violation of union rules).
9. See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 185-212 (1968).
10. 148 N.L.R.B. 674, 57 L.R.R.M. 1012 (1964), enforced, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
11. 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 57 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1964).
12. Id. at 682, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
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opinion that no private organization should be permitted to pre-
vent or regulate access to the Board .... 13
Four years later, in NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Ship-
building Workers, the Supreme Court upheld the Board's concern for
the "overriding public interest.' 14
The indefinite boundaries of such "policy" exceptions are illus-
trated by a series of cases involving union authority to discipline su-
pervisor-members.' 5 Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the NLRA 6 bans union
coercion against an employer "in the selection of his representatives
for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of griev-
ances." In San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union,17 the Board held
that this provision prevented a union from disciplining supervisor-
members for alleged misinterpretation of a collective bargaining
contract. Such discipline, the Board reasoned, would induce the super-
visors "to take pro-union positions in interpreting the collective-bar-
gaining agreement," thus "contraven[ing] the statutory policy of
allowing the Employer an unimpeded choice of representatives."' s
Following Oakland Mailers', the Board and the courts began to develop
§ 8(b)(1)(B) under this policy rationale into "a general prohibition of
a union's disciplining supervisor-members for their conduct in the
course of representing the interests of their employers."' 9 The Supreme
Court curtailed this development in Florida Power & Light Co. v.
IBETV Local 641,20 establishing certain conditions under which disci-
pline of supervisor-members is permissible.21 Yet the opinion ap-
parently leaves Oakland Mailers' intact,2 2 and in so doing creates doubt
13. Id., 57 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
14. 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968).
15. "Supervisor" is defined in NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970). Under the
Taft-Hartley amendments, supervisors are agents of the employer. "Employee" is defined
to exclude them. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). Therefore, supervisors are
denied the protection of § 7, which guarantees employees the right to organize and
bargain collectively. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Supervisors are not prohibited
from joining labor unions, although the employer cannot be compelled to deem them
"employees" for purposes of collective bargaining. NLRA § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a)
(1970). Supervisors frequently obtain union membership in order to participate in union
pension and insurance plans. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBENV Local 641,
417 U.S. 790, 792-93 & n.1 (1974).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
17. 172 N.L.R.B. 2173, 69 L.R.R.M. 1157 (1968).
18. Id. at 2174, 69 L.R.R.M. at 1159.
19. Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 802 (1974), quoting
Lithographers Locals 15-P & 272, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1080, 71 L.R.R.M. 1467, 1469 (1969).
20. 417 U.S. 790, 803 (1974).
21. The Court in Florida Power held that a union does not violate § 8(b)(1)(B) when
it disciplines "supervisor-members for crossing the picket lines and performing rank-and-
file struck work during lawful economic strikes . Id. at 792, 813.
22. See id. at 805.
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as to whether the "employer interest" doctrine has been wounded or
slain.
Even stripped of any "employer interest" accretions, the "public
policy" exception has room for expansion. The NLRB already has
held that a union may not discipline members for refusing to strike
where the collective agreement contains a no-strike clause, on the
ground that the integrity of collective agreements is a public matter
and thus beyond the disciplinary authority of the union.2 3 The Board
likewise has prohibited the fining of members who refuse to honor
illegal organizational pickets24 and secondary boycotts. 2 5 The Board's
initiatives, however, have encountered some judicial resistance, 26 and
without further clarification from the Court the contours of this public
policy exception will remain vague. This is particularly unfortunate.
The tension between union solidarity and individual rights is most
marked during a strike. It is at this time that the individual union
member is in greatest need of clear definition of his rights and lia-
bilities concerning nonconforming conduct.
The public policy argumentation also has carved a curious distinc-
tion into the Board's policy on members disciplined for filing decerti-
fication petitions. In Tawas Tube Products, Inc.27 the Board held
that § 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA28 did not prohibit the expulsion of
such members. Distinguishing the case from Skura, the Board found
that in the decertification context the member was not asking the
Board to correct an unfair labor practice, but rather was attacking
"the very existence of the union."2  Expulsion was therefore a proper,
"defensive" union response.30 Four years later, however, in Molders Lo-
cal 125 (Blackhawk Tanning Co.),a1 the NLRB refused to allow the
union to fine a member who filed a decertification petition. The Board
23. Communications Workers Local 1197, 202 N.L.R.B. 229, 82 L.R.R.M. 1530 (1973);
Glaziers Local 1162, 177 N.L.RB. 393, 73 L.R.R.M. 1125 (1969); Local 12419, UMW, 176
N.L.R.B. 628, 71 L.R.R.M. 1311 (1969). See Verville v. 1AM, 520 F.2d 615, 619 (6th Cir.
1975). Cf. Machinists Lodge 284, 190 N.L.R.B. 208, 77 L.R.R.M. 1100 (1971), modified sub
nom. Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 807 (1973) (no violation for fining workers who crossed sister
union's picket lines; no-strike clause in contract specifically permitted workers to honor
another union's legitimate picketing of employer).
24. Retail Clerks Local 1179, 211 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 86 L.R.R.M. 1588 (1974), enforced,
526 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1975).
25. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 91 L.R.R.M. 1215 (1976).
26. See NLRB v. Local 18, IUOE, 503 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding no violation
where union expels members for crossing illegal secondary picket lines).
27. 151 N.L.R.B. 46, 58 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1965).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
29. 151 N.L.R.B. at 48, 58 L.R.R.M. at 1331.
30. Id., 58 L.R.R.M. at 1331.
31. 178 N.L.R.B. 208, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969), enforced, 442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971).
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admitted, as it had not done in Tawas Tube, that every decertification
case involves an implicit balancing of the "union's right to self-
defense" with "the public policy against permitting a union to penalize
a member because he seeks the aid of the Board." 32 The Board rea-
soned that since fines did not serve the same rudimentary elements
of self-defense as expulsion-that is, they did not excise a dissident
fifth column within the union-fines could only be regarded as puni-
tive. Stripped of their self-defense rationale, fines for filing decertifi-
cation petitions were inconsistent with the logic of Skura and Tawas
Tube and were held invalid under § 8(b)(1)(A). 33
Given Allis-Chalmers, the Board's attempt to juggle the interests
of the unions, their members, and the public by limiting the form,
rather than the subject matter, of union discipline is troublesome.
As both the Allis-Chalmers Court 34 and its critics 35 have noted, the
relative coerciveness of a judicially enforced fine and an expulsion
will vary with the strength of the union. A weak union will have
little power to discourage decertification by expulsions, since mem-
bership may mean nothing to dissidents. By contrast, a worker at-
tacking a strong union may fear that he will lose not only his mem-
bership but also his job.30 Expulsion may thus deter him from seeking
the aid of the Board far more effectively than would even a substantial
fine. In view of the important public policies favoring union democ-
racy, the NLRB should prohibit any form of discipline of dissidents
who seek to unseat an incumbent union by means that Congress has
32. Id. at 209, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1050.
33. Id., 72 L.R.R.M. at 1050. Accord, Teamsters Local 165, 211 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 86
L.R.R.M. 1433 (1974). See Price v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 904 (1968).
The Board has similarly held that a member who files a certification petition for a
rival union cannot be fined, Printing Specialties Union No. 481, 183 N.L.R.B. 1271, 74
L.R.R.M. 1698 (1970), althQugh he may be suspended or expelled. See Monon Trailer,
Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 89 L.R.R.M. 1280 (1975) (leading organizational campaign on
behalf of rival union); Tri-Rivers Marine Eng'rs Union, 189 N.L.R.B. 838, 77 L.R.R.M_
1027 (1971) (soliciting authorization cards on behalf of rival union). The Board has also
held it irrelevant that expulsion was invoked for nonpayment of an illegal fine. Com-
munications Vorkers Local 6306, 212 N.L.R.B. No. 117, 87 L.R.R.M. 1590 (1974), en-
forced, 519 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1975).
34. 388 U.S. at 183.
35. See, e.g., Note, Judicial Enforcement of Labor Union Fines in State Court, 46
N.C. L. REv. 441, 443 (1968).
36. Although the worker cannot legally be dismissed from his job so long as he pays
his dues, see note 5 supra, he is probably unaware of this protection. Moreover, even if
he is fully cognizant of his rights, he still may confront the bitterness and expense of a
legal battle to regain his job. Expulsion by a strong union may also greatly hamper a
worker's ability to find a job where hiring within the trade is coordinated by a union
hiring hall. The fact that these and other forms of harassment are illegal does not make
them any less real. See, e.g., Lummus Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 517, 53 L.R.R.M. 1072 (1963),
modified, 339 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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sanctioned. The threat such dissidents pose to the union's ability to
defend its certification is, at best, overstated.37 The greater danger
is that the dissidents' fear of expulsion will perpetuate representation
that is no longer responsive to the will of the membership.
Finally, the crusade to protect the public interest has taken the
Board into union proceedings themselves. In Local 294, International
Brotherhood of Teamstersy the Board held that a fine allegedly im-
posed for causing the arrest of a union brother-an offense which
the NLRB assumed was subject to union discipline-was in reality
intended to punish the accused for filing unfair labor practice
charges. 39 The Board likewise has found violations of § 8(b)(1)(A)
in discipline imposed for pretext charges where the actual offense
was expression protected by the Landrum-Griffin Act.4 0 In one such
case, Carpenters Local 22,'41 the Board noted the suspicious nature of
the proceedings, including threats by union officials to "think of some-
thing" with which to charge the accused.
In detailing the substantive limitations on union disciplinary power,
the Board has been concerned in large part with the individual union
member and his place in the statutory scheme. Yet the shifting and
indefinite bounds of the public policy exception do not clearly de-
mark the rights of the individual. The union dissident may confront
the dilemma of either suffering potentially illegal union discipline or
relying on an ambiguous, volatile public policy exception and in-
curring the trouble of litigating union sanctions before the Board
and the courts.
B. Procedural Limitations on Union Discipline
In their 1969 survey of the procedural limitations on union dis-
cipline, Etelson and Smith concluded:
37. A union presumably has little to fear from the decertification efforts of isolated
dissidents if it commands the support of its membership.
38. 193 N.L.R.B. 920, 78 L.R.R.M. 1479 (1971), enforced, 470 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1972).
39. Id. at 926, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1483. Accord, Philadelphia Moving Picture Machine
Operators Local 307 v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1967) (voiding expulsion of mem-
-ber on four counts where three were valid, but one was for filing unfair labor practice
charge); Automotive Salesmen's Ass'n, 184 N.L.R.B. 608, 74 L.R.R.M. 1576 (1970) (voiding
fines allegedly imposed for strikebreaking, where members who had supported decertifica-
tion petition or testified against union in unfair labor practice case were fined more
heavily than others).
40. Section 101 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(Landrum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1970), established a "bill of rights" for union
members. Members are guaranteed the rights of speech and assembly, and the right to
participate fully and freely in the union's internal affairs.
41. 195 N.L.R.B. 1, 1, 79 L.R.R.M. 1194, 1195 (1972). But cI. Burch v. IAM, 433 F.2d
561 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding no pretext in terminating union president's membership for
nonpayment of dues despite evidence that international was "displeased" with him).
1028
Vol. 85: 1022, 1976
HeinOnline -- 85 Yale. L.J. 1028 1975-1976
Union Fines and Workers' Rights
[A]lthough the Landrum-Griffin Act spawned numerous contro-
versies over its scope, its procedural guarantees, and its remedial
provisions, the past ten years have seen a satisfactory resolution
of most issues. Time and further experience should lead to a
practical resolution of the conflicts which remain. The courts
are steadily moving toward a new and more desirable accommo-
dation between the private institutional needs of labor unions
and their public responsibility under our federal labor policy.42
Today this prediction seems optimistic. If procedural problems have
been resolved, it has been largely because the courts have declined
to intervene actively in internal union affairs. A member challenging
disciplinary proceedings on procedural grounds generally has only
the minimal protections of § 101(a)(5) of the Landrum-Griffin Act: 43
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended,
expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues
,.. unless such member has been (A) served with written specific
charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C)
afforded a full and fair hearing.
Even a cursory examination of the decisions applying this section
suggests that a union tribunal remains an unlikely forum for the vin-
dication of individual rights. The Supreme Court has played a major
role in preserving this union autonomy at the individual's expense.
In rejecting the view of some lower courts that "penal provisions in
42. Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline under the Landrum-Griffin Act, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 727, 771 (1969).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1970). Before he even reaches the courts, the member may
be required to exhaust his internal union appeals for up to four months. Id. § 411(a)(4).
Such appeals are normally based on union procedural safeguards that vary substan-
tially. Compare CONsT., UAW, art. 31 (1974) (guaranteeing specific charges, timely
trial, right to counsel, randomly selected trial committee, and fixed penalties) with
CONST., UNITED STEELIVORKERS, art. XIII, §§ 3, 4 (1974) (leaving all trial procedures to
discretion of local).
Unfortunately for members of more enlightened unions, there is authority suggesting
that unions need not adhere to their own procedures so long as they meet the minimal
standards of § 101(a)(5). See Buresch v. IBEW Local 24, 343 F. Supp. 183, 189-90 (D. Md.
1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1972); Null v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 239 F. Supp.
809, 814-15 (S.D. Tex. 1965). State courts, perhaps because they are unencumbered by
§ 101(a)(5), have generally reached a different conclusion. See, e.g., Posner v. Utility
Workers, 90 L.R.R.M. 2515, 2517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (Disciplinary procedures "which do
not conform to the union constitution are void and will not be enforced by the courts.");
see Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MIcH.
L. REV. 819, 835 & n.53 (1960). The approach of the Posner court is clearly correct, so long
as the courts insist on the metaphor of the constitution as a union-member contract. See
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 182-83 (1967). Surely if the member is
held to have consented to union discipline by accepting membership, his consent pre-
supposes that the union will fulfill its half of the bargain by imposing discipline only
in accordance with its own rules.
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union constitutions must be strictly construed," 44 the Court concluded
in International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman4r that there
was nothing "in either the language or the legislative history of §
101(a)(5) that could justify such a substitution of judicial for union
authority to interpret the union's regulations in order to determine
the scope of offenses warranting discipline of union members."4 6 In-
deed, the Court went so far as to explain that since "a union may
discipline its members for offenses not proscribed by written rules
at all, it is surely a futile exercise for a court to construe the written
rules in order to determine whether particular conduct falls within
or without their scope." 47
The Hardeman Court did concede that when the union's charges
make reference to specific written provisions, the courts should ex-
amine those provisions to ensure that the accused was not misled or
prejudiced in presenting his defense. 48 Yet Hardeman's overly gen-
erous attitude toward vague or even unwritten union rules seems a
clear invitation to even less specific indictments. Other courts have
continued to reverse union convictions where specificity and notice
were grossly inadequate; but in so doing each has more or less side-
stepped Hardeman,49 suggesting that the Court, by its opinion, has
impeded the progress predicted by Etelson and Smith.50
The guarantee in § 101(a)(5) of a "full and fair hearing" is also
less significant than one might wish. The courts have granted the
accused some of the rudiments of due process-the right to be present,
to call his own witnesses, and to cross-examine his accusers.,; Yet
44. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 198 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968) (quoting Allen v. International Alliance of Theatrical Em-
ployees, 338 F.2d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 1964)). See Gleason v. Chain Serv. Restaurant, 300 F.
Supp. 1241, 1252-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a!f'd per curiam, 422 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1970) (voiding
expulsion because charges lacked specificity required by § 101(a)(5)).
45. 401 U.S. 233 (1971).
46. Id. at 242-43.
47. Id. at 244-45.
48. Id. at 245. Unfortunately, disciplinary provisions in union constitutions are often
extremely vague. See T. KEELINE, NLRB AND JUDICIAL CONTROL OF UNION DISCIPLINE 88
& n.12 (U. Pa., Wharton School, Industrial Research Unit, Labor Rel. & Pub. Pol'y Serv.
Rep. No. 13, 1976) (Most prominent among disciplinary provisions are those sanctioning
"conduct detrimental to welfare" of union and "conduct unbecoming to a member.")
49. See, e.g., Smith v. Musicians, 80 L.R.R.M. 3063, 3067-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (bypassing
Hardeman and relying heavily on pre-Hardeman lower court opinions); Eisman v.
Baltimore Regional Joint Bd., Clothing Workers, 352 F. Supp. 429, 434 n.8, 435 (D. Md.
1972), afI'd per curiam, 496 F.2d 1313 (4th Cir. 1974) (distinguishing Hardeman).
50. For a more favorable assessment of judicial performance in construing § 101(a)(5),
see Beaird & Player, Union Discipline of Its Membership Under Section 101(aX5) of
Landrum-Griffin: What Is "Discipline" and How Much Process Is Due?, 9 GA. L. REV.
383 (1975).
51. See T. KEELINE, supra note 48, at 62-63 (citing cases); Etelson & Smith, supra note
42, at 745-46 (citing cases).
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growth of the fair hearing concept undoubtedly has been stunted by
the courts' unwillingness to require that the accused be allowed rep-
resentation by counsel at disciplinary hearings. 52 Although it is un-
deniably true that the framers of the Landrum-Griffin Act never in-
tended to grant a right to counsel,53 it is also true that in the past
17 years both the stakes involved in union discipline and the very
meaning of due process have changed. Unions may now impose sub-
stantial fines and enforce them judicially, thus inflicting penalties
often far harsher than the expulsion contemplated in 1959.54
At the same time that union discipline has become more severe,
the right to counsel in the criminal context has been expanded to
reach all cases in which imprisonment is a potential penalty. 55 I do not
suggest that the right to counsel in union proceedings is of constitu-
tional dimension. But if the courts are to consider the prevailing
level of due process in society in applying § 101(a)(5),56 they should
reconsider the severity of a few days in jail as opposed to a $1,000
fine l7 coupled with expulsion from the union. The latter may seri-
52. See Winterberger v. Teamsters Local 162, 89 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2737-38 (D. Ore.
1975); Smith v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 357 F. Supp. 1386, 1393 (E.D. Tenn.
1972); Buresch v. IBEW Local 24, 343 F. Supp. 183, 191-92 (D. Md. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d
1405 (4th Cir. 1972); Sawyers v. Grand Lodge, IAM, 279 F. Supp. 747, 756 (E.D. Mo.
1967); Cornelio v. Metropolitan Dist. Council United Blhd. of Carpenters, 243 F. Supp.
126, 128-29 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 358 F.2d 728 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975
(1967); Smith v. General Truck Drivers Local 467, 181 F. Snpp. 14, 17 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
As these cases illustrate, union constitutions and bylaws often expressly deny an accused
member the right to be represented by outside professional counsel. See, eg., Winter-
berger v. Teamsters Local 162, 89 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2738 (D. Ore. 1975).
53. See T. KEELINE, supra note 48, at 64; Etelson & Smith, supra note 42, at 746.
54. Before the Court in Allis-Chalmers upheld the judicial enforcement of fines, it
appeared that unions would as a rule enforce fines only through expulsion. See T.
KEELINE, supra note 48, at 18; ef. C. SUMNMERS & H. WELLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
L.%IOR LAw 1121 (1968) ("Unions, which insisted that courts should not intervene in
their internal affairs, did not look to the law to enforce their discipline.") Therefore,
expulsion was seen as the severest sanction that could be visited on a union member.
55. After more than a decade of development, a unanimous Court in Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), held that counsel must be provided when any imprisonment
may result. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas was careful to note that the Court
was not considering "the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to
counsel where loss of liberty is not involved .... " Id. at 37. Yet Justice Powell may well
have been writing for the Court of the future when he stated in concurrence:
It would be illogical-and without discernible support in the Constitution-to hold
that no discretion [as to the need for counsel] may ever be exercised where a nominal
jail sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse the legitimacy of discre-
tion in "non-jail" petty-offense cases which may result in far more serious con-
sequences than a few hours or days of incarceration.
Id. at 51.
56. See, e.g., Gleason v. Chain Serv. Restaurant, 300 F. Supp. 1241, 1251 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), afj'd, 422 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1970); Jacques v. Local 1418, Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 246 F. Supp. 857, 859-60 (E.D. La. 1965), af 'd, 404 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1969).
57. See note 70 infra.
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ously hamper the accused's ability to earn a living.rs Moreover, if the
Court is interested in eschewing complex questions of fundamental
fairness in union proceedings, it should adopt the approach it used
in the coerced confession cases59 and avoid difficult factual determi-
nations simply by requiring the right to counsel as an adequate
prophylactic.
This brief review is not intended to suggest that individuals are
completely at the mercy of their unions. It does seem, however, that
in failing to require specific indictments or the right to counsel even
in cases of major proportions, the courts have failed to appreciate the
important individual rights at stake when a union disciplines a mem-
ber. The courts have repeatedly justified their abstention by citing
the need to avoid invasion of union disciplinary functions.60 Yet
what is involved is not a jurisdictional bout between union tribunals
and federal courts. What is involved is a fundamental balancing of
the individual rights of the member and the institutional impera-
tives of his union.
II. Penalties and Enforcement
The restrictions discussed above afford the individual some shelter
from union power. If he engages in conduct protected by an im-
portant public policy, union discipline is barred. If he engages in un-
protected conduct, he may yet escape discipline if union procedures
are grossly unfair. Yet the protection afforded by these restrictions is
obviously limited and uncertain. The errant member generally will
have to face the music and incur the penalty that the trumpets
announce.
Union constitutions and bylaws typically provide for a wide range
of penalties, including suspension, expulsion, reprimands, and removal
from office. The sanction that has recently received the greatest at-
tention, however, is the monetary fine. 1 Since Allis-Chalmers it has
58. See International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 250 n.7 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Hardeman testified at trial that following the loss of his union
card he was unable to work in the boilermaker's trade beyond one job lasting five
days.") o
59. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963).
60. See, e.g., NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 72-75 (1973).
61. E.g., T. KEELINE, supra note 48; Archer, Allis-Chalmers Recycled: A Current View
of a Union's Right to Fine Employees for Crossing a Picket Line, 7 IND. L. REV. 498
(1974); Note, Union Power to Discipline Members Who Resign, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1536
(1973); Note, Union Disciplinary Fines and the Right to Resign, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
664 (1973).
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been clear that unions can enforce such fines in court. What has not
been clear until recently is the extent to which that enforcement,
and its immunity from § 8(b)(1)(A), depends on the fine's reasonable-
ness and the accused's full membership in the union. In three recent
decisions, NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Lo-
cal 1029, 02 Booster Lodge No. 405, 1AM v. NLRB,( 3 and NLRB v.
Boeing Co.,0 4 the Court resolved these questions by striking a rather
curious balance. If a worker is a "full union member," he can-so far
as federal law is concerned-be required to pay unreasonably large
fines; but if a worker resigns from his union, he apparently cannot be
fined at all.
A. The Issue of Reasonableness
In Allis-Chalmers the Supreme Court upheld judicial enforcement
of disciplinary fines. While such enforcement arguably might permit
unions to collect excessively large fines, the Court reasoned that this
concern, even were there evidence that Congress shared it, should
not prevent enforcement of fines reasonable in amount. Since §
8(b)(1)(A) did not prohibit expulsions, the Court concluded that it
should not be read to limit the often less severe penalty of a reason-
able fine.60
Two years later in Scofield v. NLRB,67 the Court seemingly made
reasonableness of both the amount of the fine and the manner of its
imposition prerequisites for judicial enforcement:
[Section] 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted
rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy
Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably en-
forced ....
In the case at hand, there is no showing in the record that
the fines were unreasonable or the mere fiat of a union
leader .... Is
Scofield invited speculation that the Court would invalidate fines
that were (1) unreasonably large in relation to the damage done the
union by members violating its rules (as suggested by the Court's
62. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
63. 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
64. 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
65. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1967).
66. Id. at 183-84, 191-93. See id. at 198 (White, J., concurring).
67. 394 U.s. 423 (1969).
68. Id. at 430.
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theory that the rules were a contract between the union and its
members); 9 (2) unreasonably large in relation to the member's abili-
ty to pay (as suggested by the anti-coercion policy of § 8(b)(1)(A)); or
(3) imposed in an arbitrary manner or on the basis of vague provisions
(as suggested by the procedural guarantees of § 101(a)(5)).
But Scofield notwithstanding, the NLRB consistently refused to
inquire into the reasonableness of union fines-even fines substan-
tially larger than those Scofield had deemed fair.70 According to the
Board, congressional intent compelled this abstention. Determinations
of reasonableness were "of an equitable nature," 71 and equity was not
an administrative province. The Board acknowledged that A llis-
Chalmers and Scofield had spoken of reasonableness, yet it argued that
these words were not addressed to the Board; they were instructions to
courts that were asked to enforce fines.72
While the Board's position fared badly in the courts of appeal,73
its reasoning prevailed where it counts most. In NLRB v. Boeing
Co.,74 the Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of union fines
was an issue for state courts, to be decided under "the law of con-
tracts, voluntary associations, or such other principles of law as may
be applied."7 5 State courts, said Justice Rehnquist, were willing and
able to address this issue:
Indeed, the expertise required for a determination of reasonable-
ness may well be more evident in a judicial forum that is called
upon to assess reasonableness in varying factual contexts than it is
69. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 182, 192 (1967). See also T.
KE.LINE, supra note 48, at 87-88.
70. In Scofield the union imposed fines of $50 and $100. 394 U.S. at 426. Among the
many cases in which the NLRB refused to consider the reasonableness of fines are:
Machinists Lodge 284, 190 N.L.R.B. 208, 77 L.R.R.M. 1100 (1971), modified sub non.
Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S.
807 (1973) ($1,000 fine for crossing sister union's picket line); Printing Pressmen's Union
No. 60, 190 N.L.R.B. 268, 77 L.R.R.M. 1199 (1971) (S2,000 fine for one day of strikebreak-
ing); Carpenters Local Union 101, 186 N.L.R.B. 708, 75 L.R.R.M. 1421 (1970) (S300 fine
for four hours of strikebreaking); Rubber Workers Local 510, 186 N.L.R.B. 765, 75
L.R.R.M. 1420 (1970) ($525 fine for strikebreaking that yielded member S425 in wages);
Booster Lodge No. 405, !AM, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1970), modified, 459
F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd in relevant part sub nora. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S.
67 (1973) (S450 fine for strikebreaking that yielded member approximately "225).
71. IAM Local Lodge 504, 185 N.L.R.B. 365, 368, 75 L.R.R.M. 1008, 1010 (1970), rev'd
sub nor. O'Reilly v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded sub nora.
JAM Local Lodge 504 v. O'Reilly, 414 U.S. 807 (1973).
72. Id., 75 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
73. Morton Salt Fo. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded,
414 U.S. 807 (1973); Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir.
1972), rev'd in relevant part sub non. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
74. 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
75. Id. at 74.
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in a specialized agency. In assessing the reasonableness of dis-
ciplinary fines, for example, state courts are often able to draw
on their experience in areas of law apart from labor relations.70
A review of Justice Rehnquist's evidence in support of his faith
is not reassuring. The Court cited seven state cases considering union
fines.77 In two the fines were approved with no substantive discus-
sion of their reasonableness. 78 In two other cases the issue was allotted
less than a paragraph, and the fines were summarily upheld as liqui-
dated damages under the contract theory of the union-member rela-
tionship 0 endorsed in Allis-Chalmers." A New Jersey decision was
cited by the Court for reduction of a $750 fine to $500. Yet the New
Jersey court actually held the fine of $250 for each offense reasonable
in amount;," the reduction owed not to any excessiveness of the fine,
but to the trial court's finding insufficient proof for the union
board's guilty verdict on one charge. -82 In a Pennsylvania case a $300
fine was reduced to $100 solely because the larger sum could have
made an intraunion appeal prohibitively expensive.83
The only decision cited by the Court that involved reduction of
a fine on grounds of reasonableness was that of the Los Angeles
Municipal Court in Farnum v. Kurtz.8 4 There the court, in reducing
a fine for circulating a "nasty letter" about union officials, cited no
contract and precious little labor law. It concluded that the union had
not been damaged in the amount of its fine. "Moreover," the judge
added,
this Court has had the duty and obligation of passing judgment
in thousands of cases where defendants were found guilty of mis-
demeanors. In the vast majority of such cases the first offender
is also dealt with kindly, compassionately, and understandingly,
76. Id. at 76-77 (footnotes omitted).
77. Id. at 76-77 nn.12-13.
78. Jost v. Communications Workers Local 9408, 13 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 722 (1970) (court expressed willingness to discuss reasonableness had issue been
raised by parties); Local 248, UAV v. Natzke, 36 Wis. 2d 237, 153 N.W.2d 602 (1967).
79. Walsh v. Communications Workers Local 2336, 259 Md. 608, 614-15, 271 A.2d 148,
151 (1970); UAV Local 283 v. Scofield, 50 Wis. 2d 117, 134, 183 N.V.2d 103, 112 (1971).
See Communications Workers Local 6003 v. Jackson, 84 L.R.R.M. 2689 (Okla. Sup. Ct.
1973) (upholding $275 strikebreaking fine as reasonable, citing Walsh liquidated damages
theory).
80. 388 U.S. at 192.
81. Newspaper Guild Local 173 v. Rakos, 110 N.J. Super. 77, 91, 264 A.2d 453, 460-61
(App. Div. 1970).
82. Id. at 81-82, 264 A.2d at 456.
83. McCauley v. Federation of Musicians, 26 L.R.R.M. 2304, 2305-06 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
1950) (privilege of appeal conditioned on payment of half of fine).
84. 70 L.R.R.M. 2035 (L.A. Mun. Ct. 1968).
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not only by this individual judge but by practically all judges.
The first offender in misdemeanor cases is usually regarded as a
student who should be taught that society requires its laws be
obeyed, not as a hardened criminal.
Based upon the facts herein and the Court's experience afore-
said, the fine assessed is much too large and unreasonables8
Whatever else may be said for this melange of contract, criminal,
and labor law, it is clear that state courts have not yet developed
anything approaching a consistent view of the reasonableness of union
fines. Indeed, it is surprising that the Supreme Court expects them to
do so. The contracts involved are almost always union rules which
are easily changed and are drafted, interpreted, and applied by union
officials. The applicable "criminal law" principles are seldom specific
and are applied in the first instance by union trial boards, tribunals
that have few of the safeguards of a criminal court. And the labor law
in this area is now, thanks to Boeing, an enormous vacuumYso
The responsibility for determining the reasonableness of a fine
should have been vested in the Board. Member McCulloch, dissenting
in 1AM Local Lodge 504,87 argued persuasively that while the line de-
limiting reasonable fines might be difficult to draw, the need for a
85. Id. at 2041.
86. Besides providing no substantive guidance to state courts for determining the
reasonableness of union fines, Boeing creates several procedural ambiguities. For example,
as fines increase, defendant union members may be entitled to jury trials. Because state
courts generally treat fines as compensating the union for its damages, see T. KEELINE,
supra note 48, at 87-88, the question of whether a fine is reasonable is decided by
the jury. Indeed, one state court has already held that the reasonableness of the fine is
a question of fact. Ballas v. McKiernan, 63 Misc. 2d 432, 435, 312 N.Y.S.2d 204, 208 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 41 App. Div. 2d 131, 341 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1973), aff'd,
35 N.Y.2d 14, 315 N.E.2d 758, 358 N.Y.S.2d 695, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974). Thus
the Boeing Court's faith in the experience of state judges may, in reality, come to rest on
less experienced state juries.
Given state courts' analogy of union fines to liquidated damages, see p. 1035 supra,
the courts must decide whether the union or its fined member bears the burden of
proof on reasonableness. In contract actions generally the defendant must prove that
the amount fixed in the liquidated damages clause is unreasonable in light of actual
damages flowing from the breach. See, e.g., Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock &
Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681, 686, 220 A.2d 263, 267 (1966). In the case of union fines, how-
ever, no fixed amount is established before the breach. Instead, the union fills in a
blank in an implied, unwritten clause to the effect that, "I, loyal union member, promise
to pay the union $_ if I am found guilty of breaking union rules." Given this
interpretation, the plaintiff union would seem to have the iisltial' burden of proiing that
its completion of the blank was reasonable. State courts have not yet examined this
question, but its very formulation suggests the folly of allowing state courts to enforce
imaginary contracts without limitations derived from somewhat more substantial labor
law.
87. 185 N.L.R.B. 365, 75 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1970), rev'd sub nora. O'Reilly v. NLRB, 472
F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded sub nora. IAM Local Lodge 504 v..
O'Reilly, 414 U.S. 807 (1973).
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uniform labor policy required that the Board, and not 50 state
courts, accept the task.s8 A reasonable fine, said McCulloch, should
not exceed the gain the member derived from his prohibited conduct.
In assessing greater penalties, a union would go beyond the permis-
sible bounds of regulating its internal affairs, coercing its members
in violation of § 8(b)(1)(A). 5 9
This rule is hardly foolproof. It would bend if a union could
prove damages greater than the wages a strikebreaker earned. It would
fail completely in cases where discipline is imposed for noneconomic
conduct. Yet a prima facie rule that a union may deny transgressors
only the fruits of their offenses seems far more promising than the
cursory examinations thus far provided by state courts. Moreover, it
is difficult to believe that state courts, with little or no experience
in labor relations, will develop more consistent and rational standards
than would the NLRB, which frequently is required to determine
the reasonableness of labor-related activity.90
The Court's approach in Boeing may lead unions to impose still
larger, more coercive fines. The worker will have little hope of re-
lief. By refusing to consider his claims under § 8(b)(1)(A), the Court
leaves him with only the far less effective remedy9' of defending him-
self in state court-when, and if, the union seeks judicial enforcement.
The Court's holding undoubtedly has made it less likely that a union
will need to sue to collect its fines, save from its most well-informed
and litigious members.
88. Id. at 371, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1013. Justice Rehnquist responded to this argument in
Boeing by standing the preemption doctrine on its head:
Since state courts will have jurisdiction to determine reasonableness in the enforce-
ment context in any event, the Board's independent determination of reasonableness
in an unfair labor practice might well yield a conflict when the two forums
are called upon to review the same fine.
412 U.S. at 77-78. This argument assumes its conclusion: that an unreasonably large fine
is not a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A). For if the Board and the Court were willing to brand
such fines as coercive, the Board's jurisdiction over the initial imposition of the fine
would preclude any subsequent enforcement by state courts. See Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
89. 185 N.L.R.B. at 370-71, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1013. McCulloch argued that a fine in
excess of the wages earned by strikebreaking effectively assesses the worker a sum
representing wages earned after the strike is over. The union thus goes beyond internal
sanctions and interferes impermissibly with the worker's employment rights. See p. 1022
& note 4 supra. The Boeing dissent recited McCulloch's argument approvingly. 412 U.S.
at 82 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
90. The Board determinations most akin to the reasonableness of disciplinary fines
are those involving excessive initiation fees. Section 8(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(5) (1970),
requires the Board to consider the reasonableness of such fees.
91. Not only is the union member subjected to greater uncertainty, but a court fight
will also undoubtedly be more expensive than pressing a complaint before the NLRB.
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B. Jurisdiction over the Member
At the same time that they were retreating from the problem of
unreasonably large fines, the Board and the Court were developing
the proposition that a union cannot impose any fine on a member
for his conduct after resigning from the union. Not only are such
fines unenforceable, but they violate § 8(b)(1)(A) as well. This proposi-
tion holds promise for dissidents who decide that the potential liability
for breaking union rules outweighs the advantages of being a union
member.
The individual's ability to immunize himself from union disci-
pline by resigning was first tested in NLRB v. Granite State Joint
Board, Textile Workers Local 1029.92 The court of appeals held that a
member's liberty to resign from the union and return to work during a
strike is qualified by the contract doctrine of mutual reliance.9 3 The
court found that, having voted for a strike, a latter-day dissident was
barred from crossing the picket line he had helped to erect. If he
disappointed his fellow members' expectations he could be fined, his
timely resignation notwithstanding. The Supreme Court reversed.
Giving -the mutual reliance doctrine "little weight,"9 4 the Court held
that strike solidarity must yield to the individual's right under § 7
of the NLRA 5 to refrain from "concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining":
Events occurring after the calling of a strike may have unsettling
effects, leading a member who voted to strike to change his mind.
The likely duration of the strike may increase the specter of
hardship to his family; the ease with which the employer re-
places the strikers may make the strike seem less provident ....
[T]he vitality of § 7 requires that the member be free to refrain
in November from the actions he endorsed in May . . .9
Citing Allis-Chalmers07 and Scofield,98 the Court held that after the
lawful dissolution of their relationship "the union has no more con-
92. 446 F.2d 369 (ist Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
93. Id. at 372-73.
94. 409 U.S. at 217.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
96. 409 U.S. at 217-18.
97. Id. at 215 (workers legitimately fined in Allis-Chalmers "enjoyed full union mem-
bership") (citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 196 (1967)).
98. 409 U.S. at 215-16 (citing Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969)). In Scofield,
the Court observed that
§ 8(b)(l)(A) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a
legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor
laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the
union and escape the rule.
394 U.S. at 430 (emphasis added).
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trol over [its] former member than it has over the man in the street."99
In Booster Lodge No. 405, 1AM v. NLRBI°° the Machinists Union
argued that its constitution provided a basis for such continuing con-
trol. The constitution contained an express anti-strikebreaking clause.
Invoking the metaphor of the "union-member contract," the Ma-
chinists contended that a worker was bound to honor his pledge,
freely undertaken while a member, even after he had resigned. Unan-
imously, the Court demurred. It refused to deduce an implied post-
resignation commitment from the constitutional proscription, as it
had refused to infer such an implied commitment from the strike
vote in Granite State.'0' Thus, the former member was under no
obligation to refrain from strikebreaking, and the union violated
§ 8(b)(1)(A) when it fined him for working. 102
99. 409 U.S. at 217. The Court held that a "union commits an unfair labor practice
when it seeks enforcement of fines" for a worker's post-resignation conduct. Id. It may
be argued that in stressing the "enforcement of fines" rather than the act of fining, the
Court avoided the issue of whether a union may fine a resigner where the fine is en-
forced only by expulsion. If a fine may be enforced by expulsion, the disciplined ex-
member will be forced to pay the fine before he can regain membership. The Board
apparently has taken the position that a post-resignation fine is illegal regardless of how
it is enforced. See Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 382, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004,
1006-07 (1970), modified, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd in part, 412 U.S. 84, and
rev'd in part sub nom. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973) (union violates § 8(b)(l)(A)
"by imposing discipiinary fines on resigners" and is ordered to cease such conduct "in-
cluding attempts to collect the illegal fines through court proceedings" (emphasis added)).
The Fifth Circuit has held, however, that a post-resignation fine is valid if enforceable
solely by expulsion. Local 1255, IAM v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1972), denying
enforcement to 188 N.L.R.B. 928, 76 L.R.R.M. 1456 (1971).
A related question is whether a union may discipline a resigner by imposing sanctions
other than fines. The Board's position seems to be that a union may expel a resigned
member, although it may not suspend him. Compare District Lodges 99 & 1239, IAM, 194
N.L.R.B. 938, 79 L.R.R.M. 1208 (1972), with Pattern Makers' Ass'n, 199 N.L.R.B. 96, 81
L.R.R.M. 1177 (1972). The Board's distinction between expulsions and suspensions has
thus far failed to impress the courts. See, e.g., NLRB v. District Lodge 99, 489 F.2d 769,
771 (1st Cir. 1974), modifying 194 N.L.R.B. 938, 79 L.R.R.M. 1208 (1972). In approving
discipline against resigners in the form of expulsion or fines enforceable by expulsion,
the courts have relied upon the proviso to § 8(b)(l)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1970),
which preserves the union's right to prescribe rules for acquiring membership. See 489
F.2d at 771; Local 1255, IAM v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 1214, 1217 (5th Cir. 1972). Expulsion is
merely a bar to membership; a fine enforceable by expulsion merely conditions readmis-
sion to membership on payment of the fine. Id.
This suggestion that a union can expel a member who has already resigned is odd
and may lead to confusion among both union members and the courts should the mem-
ber seek reinstatement. It would seem far better to stress the Granite State Court's
.man in the street" language and hold that once the member resigns the union cannot
discipline him in any way. The possibility of members jumping in and out of a union
merely to avoid strikebreaking penalties should not arise since such activity would incur
additional initiation fees and substantial social pressure upon reinstatement.
100. 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
101. Id. at 89-90.
102. Unfortunately, the holding in Booster Lodge is less clear than one would wish.
The Court noted that the anti-strikebreaking clause did not expressly apply to former
members and that the resigners did not realize that the union interpreted the clause as
applying to them. This reasoning suggests that, had the constitution contained an ex-
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Granite State and Booster Lodge appear to establish firmly the in-
dividual's right to insulate himself from union fines by withdrawing
from union membership. Upon resignation, the union's jurisdiction
over the worker, and hence its power to fine him, ends. Yet a closer
examination of what the Court said, and left unsaid, about that right
to resign suggests some rather unsettling possibilities.
III. Limitations on the Right to Resign
After a decade of development, the Supreme Court has shaped the
law of union discipline in such a fashion that the dissident's best,
indeed his only clear avenue of escape from union discipline is resig-
nation. Given the variety of pressures on workers in organized indus-
tries today, of course, Leonard Woodcock and Frank Fitzsimmons
need not fear mass withdrawals tomorrow. Even so, an effective and
well-known right to resign would protect the worker who disagreed
with union policy without financially injuring the union with a
security clause.'0 3
I would suggest, however, that the right to resign is neither effec-
tive nor well-known and that the Court and the Board are to blame.
The Court's decisions, which so distinctly proclaimed the right to
resign, contain dicta suggesting that the right may be far from absolute.
Moreover, even if theoretically unlimited, the right to resign may
go unexercised as a result of ignorance and misinformation. Owing
to the ambiguity of over-inclusive union security clauses which simply
require "membership" in the union as a condition of employment,
a worker may well be deterred from resignation by fear of losing his
job. Most importantly, few workers are even aware of their right to
press ban on post-resignation strikebreaking of which the workers were aware, the union
could have fined them even though they had resigned. The Court's suggestion that a
union constitution can restrict the post-resignation conduct of its former members is
ominous and utterly inconsistent with the Court's "man in the street" language in
Granite State.
Now that the Court has given the cue, however, it seems only a matter of time be-
fore unions amend their constitutions and bylaws to make their regulations explicitly ap-
plicable to resigners. Indeed, the Machinists have already done so. See RULES OF ODrR
FOR LOCAL LoDnrs, IAM, art. L, § 3 (1974) (resignation during strike or less than 14
days before strike begins will not relieve members of obligation not to strikebreak). In
the first test of the Machinists' provision, the Board rose to the occasion and held that
the provision impaired workers' § 7 rights. It therefore invalidated strikebreaking fines
against resigners. Machinists Local 1994, 215 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 88 L.R.R.M. 1120 (1974).
Yet the Court's unfortunate language in Booster Lodge assures that further litigation will
follow. For an argument that an explicit union prohibition of post-resignation strike-
breaking would be valid, see Note, Union Power to Discipline Members Who Resign,
supra note 61, at 1553-57.
103. See note 5 supra.
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resign. It is here that the Board has failed. The Board must take steps
not only to prevent unions from unduly restricting the right of resigna-
tion, but also to require that unions inform members of their free-
dom to resign with impunity.
A. Union Restrictions on the Right to Resign
The major uncertainty to be resolved concerns the degree to which
a union can limit the right of resignation through its constitution,
bylaws, or collective agreements. In permitting resignations in the
past, the Board and the lower courts have noted that the constitutions
before them contained no express restrictions on the right to resign.10 4
In Granite State the Court plainly reserved the question of a union's
power to develop such restrictions: "We do not now decide to what
extent the contractual relationship between union and member may
curtail the freedom to resign."'105 The Court encouraged further
speculation in Booster Lodge when it said, in a footnote, that "[s]ince
the collective-bargaining agreement expired prior to the times of the
resignations, the maintenance-of-membership clause therein was no
impediment to resigning." 100 Inasmuch as a worker's obligation under
this or any type of union security clause is limited to payment of
dues, 07 it is hard to understand how a maintenance-of-membership
clause could ever pose an "impediment to resigning"-provided, of
course, that the resigner tenders dues. Nevertheless, this strange little
footnote suggests that such a clause can, under so far unknown con-
ditions, limit the right to resign.10 s
104. See, e.g., Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143, 1153 (D.C. Cir.
1972), ajf'd in part, 412 U.S. 84, and rev'd in part sub nom. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412
U.S. 67 (1973). Machinists Local 1994, 215 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 88 L.R.R.M. 1120, 1122 (1974);
District Lodges 99 & 2139, IAM, 194 N.L.R.B. 938, 938, 79 L.R.R.M. 1208, 1208 (1972).
105. 409 U.S. at 217. See Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 88 (1973)
(**And here, as [in Granite State], we leave open the question of the extent to which
contractual restriction on a member's right to resign may be limited by the [NLRA].")
106. 412 U.S. at 88 n.8. Maintenance-of-melnbership provisions impose no obligations
on nonmembers, but require employees who have voluntarily elected to join the union to
maintain their union membership for the life of the contract or some other specified
time period. Maintenance-of-membership provisions appear in approximately four percent
of all collective bargaining agreements and are especially common in the petroleum, tex-
tile, and insurance industries. 2 COLL. BARG. NEGor. & CONTR. (BNA) 87:2-3 (1975). A
maintenance-of-membership arrangement differs from the more common union shop, tin-
der which all employees in a bargaining unit are required to join the union and main-
tain their membership as a condition of employment.
107. See pp. 1048-51 infra.
108. Collective agreements requiring maintenance of membership frequently establish
"escape periods" during which employees may resign from the union. Escape periods
typically run for 10, 15, or 30 days and usually come at the start of the contract term,
at its conclusion, or at the contract anniversary date. See 2 COLL. BARG. NEGOT. & CONTR.
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Despite the Court's confusing statements in Granite State and
Booster Lodge, neither the Board nor any post-Allis-Chalmers court
has yet found a valid union restriction on the right to resign. This
record has been fairly easy to maintain because few unions have ex-
plicitly addressed the question of a member's resignation rights. It
seems only a matter of time, however, before unions revise their
constitutions to restrict this important means of escaping discipline.
Indeed, the process of revision has begun .10
What type of restriction would be valid? The Teamsters' require-
ment" ° that a member meet any outstanding financial obligations
should pass muster. In fact, such a provision may not even be neces-
sary. Voluntary association cases at common law conditioned the free-
dom to resign on the payment of past dues and assessments."'
Reasonable restrictions designed to ensure that a resignation is in-
tentional should also be upheld. The Board has adopted the general
rule that an effective resignation should be in writing, although it
(BNA) 87:141-42 (1976). The Board has taken a hostile position toward contract escape
periods. See Chemical Workers Local 143, 188 N.L.R.B. 705, 707 & n.3, 76 L.R.R.M. 1385,
1387 & n.3 (1971) (holding one-day escape period invalid). The only court to confront
them has sidestepped the issue of their validity. See NLRB v. Mechanical Workers Local
444, 427 F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding two-week escape period in new contract
inapplicable to resignations tendered before new contract took effect).
Alternatively, the union might try to block a resignation by relying on dicta in
Supreme Court decisions suggesting that a union may waive all other membership re-
quirements and declare that the resigner who merely pays dues is a "full member" sub-
ject to union discipline. In NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1963),
the Court stated:
Of course, if the union chooses to extend membership even though the employee will
meet only the minimum financial burden, and refuses to support or "join" the union
in any other affirmative way, the employee may have to become a "member" under
a union shop contract, in the sense that the union may be able to place him on its
rolls. /
In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 197 (1967) (footnote omitted), the
Court expressly reserved the question of the legality of disciplining mere dues-payers:
Whether [the] prohibitions [of § 8(b)(1)(A)] would apply if the locals had imposed
fines on members whose membership was in fact limited to the obligation of paying
monthly dues is a question not before us and upon which we intimate no view.
It seems absurd to suggest that a union may redefine its membership to include those
who grudgingly pay dues, but who have expressed a clear intent to limit their participa-
tion to the barest minimum. The Allis-Chalmers Court, despite its refusal to consider
the question of disciplinary powers over mere dues-payers, cited General Motors for the
proposition that § 8(a)(3) "whittled down" the obligation of such "members" to its
"financial core." 388 U.S. at 197 n.37. Despite such language, and the plain intent of the
resignation decisions, one is left hoping for a clear and explicit resolution of the doubts
which linger.
109. See Millan, Disciplinary Developments Under § S(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 20 Loy. L. REv. 245, 268-73 (1974).
110. CONSr. INT'L BHD. OF TL_,%tsEs, art. II, § 2(h) (1971) (No member may resign,
nor will his resignation become effective, until "all dues, assessments, fines and other
obligations" have been paid.)
111. See, e.g., Communications Workers v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 835, 838 (2d Cir. 1954)
(relying on and discussing common law rule).
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has permitted resignation in the form of surrendered membership
cards,112 and, occasionally, oral resignations."13 More elaborate resig-
nation procedures, involving witnesses, "magic words," or "counseling"
by union officials, should be invalidated. These procedures are either
unnecessary, given the informal agreement between a union and its
members, or coercive, providing union officials with an opportunity
to pressure a member to stay within the organization. Provisions re-
quiring a resigner to notify the union of his decision should likewise
be acceptable, provided the requirements are kept to a minimum:
no more should be demanded than a written statement. Although
the union occasionally may need a brief period to update its records,
more restrictive provisions requiring "advance warning" or a waiting
period" 4 should be voided as needless interference with the freedom
to resign.115
Unfortunately, the Board has complicated the simplicity of its writ-
ten-notification rule by holding that resignation does not take effect
until notice is actually received. The member who wants to avoid
a personal confrontation must wait until the "close of the business
day" on which his mailed resignation reaches union officials.,", Since
strikes often are called on short notice, and since the Board's ab-
stention on "reasonableness" may permit a member to be heavily
fined for only a few hours of strikebreaking," 7 this rule could prove
a trap. Nor is it necessary. A union gains little by receiving actual
notice of a member's resignation. Although the Board must ensure
that workers do not gain retroactive immunity for crossing picket
lines, a worker who has irrevocably entrusted his resignation to the
mails should be at liberty to break union rules. The Internal Revenue
Service is content with a postmark.
112. E.g., Communications Workers Local 6135, 188 N.L.R.B. 971, 971, 76 L.R.R.M.
1635, 1636 (1971).
113. Local 1384, UAWv, 219 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 90 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1154 (1975); Mechan-
ical Workers Local 444, 173 N.L.R.B. 325, 327, 69 L.R.R.M. 1384, 1385 (1968).
Despite repeated union attempts to argue that a particular resigner's actions were in-
consistent or ambiguous, in only one case has the Board held that a member failed to
resign. That individual had merely revoked his dues-checkoff authorization and told a
union official that he was "thinking of getting out of the Union." District Lodges 99 &
2139, IAM, 194 N.L.R.B. 938, 938, 79 L.R.R.M. 1208, 1210 (1972).
114. Cf. CONST., IUE, art. XIX, § D (1975) (60-day advance notice required); Co,%sr.,
UAW, art. 6, § 17 (1974) (resignation must be tendered during last 10 days of fiscal year;
resignation effective 60 days after end of fiscal year).
115. Contra, Millan, supra note 109, at 277 (advocating 60-to-90-day waiting period).
116. Local 1012, United Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers, 187 N.L.R.B. 375, 375, 76
L.R.R.M. 1038, 1038 (1970), followed in Bookbinders Local 60, 203 N.L.R.B. 732, 734 &
n.9, 83 L.R.R.M. 1518 (1973).
117. E.g., Printing Pressmen's Union No. 60, 190 N.L.R.B. 268, 272, 77 L.R.R.M. 1199
(1971) (S2,000 fine for one day of strikebreaking); Carpenters Local 101, 186 N.L.R.B. 708,
75 L.R.R.M. 1421 (1970) (5300 fine for four hours of strikebreaking).
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Finally, the courts will undoubtedly be faced with provisions barring
resignation entirely, barring it during strikes,118 or permitting it only
at certain inconvenient times. To date, the most notorious of these
provisions is the Auto Workers' requirement that members tender
their resignations by registered mail during the last 10 days of the
fiscal year.119 The First Circuit upheld the 10-day restriction over a
decade ago, finding a "rational basis" for it in the union's need to
preserve fiscal certainty. 20 The Board, however, has persistently struck
the provision down 2 't and has indicated that it will continue to do
so unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise.122
Let us hope that the Board's action is a portent of things to come.
Under § 7, Scofield, 2 3 and the resignation cases, any union restriction
on the timing of resignations should be declared invalid. If the resig-
nation doctrine is to mean anything, the right to resign cannot be
confined to those few periods when the member is least likely to be
disenchanted with his union.124 Indeed, § 7 requires that a member
be free to leave even at times of greatest stress. To hold otherwise
is to resurrect the discredited doctrine of mutual reliance and liken
the member, as the union urged in Granite State, to a "volunteer
for military service" who "is under strict discipline for the duration.' '112 ;
Such pleas should not sway the courts in explicating the right to
resign. It is difficult to believe that union leaders are so far removed
from their rank and file that they cannot predict how many deserters
they will encounter during a strike. To the extent that union officials
do have honest doubts about their capacity to wage protracted economic
118. E.g., CONST., IUE, art. XIX, § D (1975). The Newspaper Guild amended its con-
stitution after Booster Lodge to prohibit acceptance of resignations or withdrawals dur-
ing strikes. Millan, supra note 109, at 268.
119. CONST., UAW, art. 6, § 17 (1974).
120. NLRB v. UAW, 320 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1963). The opinion, of course, came
down before Allis-Chalmers, Scofield, and the resignation decisions.
121. Local 469, UAW, 221 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 90 L.R.R.M. 1563, 1564 (1975); Local
1384, UAW, 219 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 90 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1154 & n.4 (1975); UAW Local 647,
197 N.L.R.B. 608, 609, 80 L.R.R.M. 1411, 1412 (1972).
122. 90 L.R.R.M. at 1154 n.4. The Court missed its chance in Granite State. The
Textile Workers had argued that their practice was to accept resignations only during
an annual 10-day escape period, with which the resigners had failed to comply. Rather
than determining the validity of the practice the Court apparently found it ifiapplicable
because the resigners were unaware of it. 409 U.S. at 217 n.5.
123. See note 98 supra.
124. Professor Gould has noted that, while auto strikes normally are called in
September, the UAW member has to make his resignation decision between December 21
and 31, hardly a time for sober reflection. See Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union
Discipline Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers,
1970 DuKaE L.J. 1067, 1105.
125. Brief for Respondent at 15, NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers
Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
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war (a source of concern if one accepts the underlying rationale of
Allis-Chalmers26), they could poll their membership in a secret bal-
lot.127 Moreover, unions are meant to be democratic institutions. If
unfettered freedom to resign so depletes a union's ranks over time
that the strength of its strike is sapped, one is tempted to say that the
members have spoken, the consensus has evaporated, and the strike
should come to an end.
While this area of union discipline is uncertain, guidance is avail-
able. In considering future restrictions on the right to resign, the
Board and the courts should follow the spirit, if not the literal pre-
scriptions, of both the discipline and the resignation decisions. They
should hold that a union may do no more than require resigners
to fulfill past financial obligations and tender their resignations in
an unambiguous manner.
B. The Real and Imagined Effects of Resignation
Union constitutional restrictions are only a threshold impediment
to resigning. As the disaffected union member contemplates the re-
wards of resignation, it undoubtedly will occur to him that the benefits
will not be realized without some corresponding costs. His assessment
of these costs will determine whether the right to resign, which we
shall assume is freely available, will actually be exercised.
Resignation plainly has its disadvantages. Most notably the worker
will lose whatever influence he onc had in the union which will
continue to represent him, despite his resignation, in negotiations
with his employer. Unfortunately, the worker may be misled into
thinking that resignation will mean the loss, not only of internal union
126. "The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's
arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms, and '[t]he power to fine or expel strike-
breakers is essential if the union is to be an effective bargaining agent' . . . . 388 U.S.
at 181 (quoting Summers, Legal Linitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REV. 1049,
1049 (1951)).
127. If the union were to sample rank-and-file opinion, including periodic checks on
members' inclination to resign, all strike votes and such opinion sampling would have
to be conducted in a confidential manner to insure accuracy. Unfortunately, while some
unions now require such secrecy, many others do not. See Brief for IAM as Amicus
Curiae at 16a-17a, NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Local 1029, 409
U.S. 213 (1972).
It is not persuasive for union leaders who conduct nonconfidential strike votes to argue
that free resignation will defeat their carefully developed consensus. Indeed, the Granite
State Court probably was impressed by the fact that the strike vote in that case, touted
by the First Circuit as an expression of unanimous resolve, 446 F.2d at 370-73, in reality
stood for very little because the balloting was not secret. See Brief for Petitioner at 20
n.16, NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972)
("Radziewicz, the first employee to resign, testified that he attended the strike authoriza-
tion meeting and 'stood up' in favor of the strike because 'they all stood up.' ")
1045
HeinOnline -- 85 Yale. L.J. 1045 1975-1976
The Yale Law Journal
benefits, but also of his job. His dismissal most certainly should be
illegal. Yet the Court has failed, in its union fine cases, to clarify the
law.
1. Resignation and Union Rights
In making his resignation decision, the dissident must remember
that the union whose policies he finds distasteful will continue to
hold substantial economic power over him as exclusive bargaining
agent.'28 By resigning, the worker surrenders his right to vote for
union officials, to express himself at union meetings, and even to
participate in determining the amount or use of dues he may be
forced to pay under a union security clause . 2 9 Throughout the col-
lective bargaining process he will be mute. He will have no part in
formulating the union's demands or in choosing its bargaining team;
he will have no vote in declaring a strike or in ratifying the contract
it produces.'30 Although he will be able to cross picket lines with
immunity from union discipline, his "right to work" may prove
hollow. Strikebreaking is never pleasant; in most heavily unionized
industries it may be impossible, since the stoppage will often shut
operations down entirely. The nonmember will then have to endure
a strike he has had no part in calling, unassisted by any strike benefits
that union members receive.
The dissident should also consider the effect of resignation on his
use of the collective agreement's grievance procedures. No matter
how impartial the union is in processing grievances, the nonmember
may find that his interests have been previously bartered away so
effectively that he simply has no grounds for invoking the procedure.
A worker who has challenged the union may also have difficulty
persuading the members of a union grievance committee to act on
his complaint, however valid. Although a nonmember is not com-
128. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), provides that the representative selected
by a majority of the employees in a unit shall be the exclusive bargaining representative
of all employees in the unit. This provision provides the basic statutory underpinning
for the "duty of fair representation," the duty of a union to represent fairly all em-
ployees for which it is the bargaining representative, regardless of whether those em-
ployees are members of the union. H. WNLLLINGTON, supra note 9, at 129-84.
129. The, mimber's rights of participation in union government, including, but not
limited to, the rights enumerated in the text, are guaranteed by the Landrum-Griffin
Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1), (2), (3) (1970). That Act, however, defines "member," the
term used in all the guarantee provisions, as one "who has fulfilled the requirements for
membership . . . and who neither has voluntarily withdrawn from membership nor has
been expelled or suspended from membership .... " Id. § 402(o).
130. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 737 (1963) (employees deciding
not to join "would not be entitled to attend union meetings, vote upon ratification of
agreements negotiated by the union, or have a voice in the internal affairs of the union").
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pletely at the mercy of such officials, the deference shown by the
Board and the courts to union "discretion" in processing claims should
be considered by the dissident before he decides to resign.' 3 '
A more pressing factor will be fear of tangible loss. A union, of
course, may not deprive a resigner of insurance, pension, or similar
payments that accrue from the operation of the collective contract.
The Board and the courts have repeatedly held that a union violates
§ 8(b)(1)(A) when it denies, or threatens to deny, such "terms of em-
ployment" to nonmembers. 132 Yet the union can, and undoubtedly
will, deny resigners union benefits, including pensions, insurance,
strike benefits, medical facilities, recreation centers, and dependents'
scholarships. 133 The former member has financed these benefits in
the past and may be forced to fund them in the future through con-
tinuing dues. 3 4 American unions in 1973 had a net worth of almost
$2.9 billion or nearly $150 per member. 35 While the value of this
131. Under the proviso to NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), the employee may
present grievances directly to his employer. See NLRB v. Union Pac. Stages, Inc., 99 F.2d
153, 164 (9th Cir. 1938). Yet in attempting to invoke the final appeal to arbitration as
provided in most collective agreements, the employee must rely on the union's duty of
fair representation, a breach of which is often difficult to prove. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 190-93 (1967) (merely proving that employee's claim is meritorious insufficient
to show breach of duty of fair representation when union subsequently chooses not to
seek arbitration).
132. E.g., Local 167, Progressive Mine Workers v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 538 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (pension benefits); Teamsters Local 729, 167 N.L.R.B. 147,
66 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1967) (insurance benefits).
133. See NLRB v. Local 286, UAW, 222 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1955) (union which threatens
employees with loss of insurance benefits unless they pay disciplinary assessments not
guilty of unfair labor practice).
134. Since the union shop was permitted out of a concern that nonmembers would
be given a "free ride" in the collective bargaining process, the Board at one time had
held that a mere dues-payer could refuse to pay dues levied for nonbargaining purposes.
Teamsters Local 959 (RCA Service Co.), 167 N.L.R.B. 1042, 1044, 66 L.R.R.M. 1203, 1205
(1967); see NLRB v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 307 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1962) (affirming Board
iuling that special strike assessments are not dues that may be demanded under union
security clause).
More recently, however, the Board has all but overruled RCA Service, holding that no
basis exists for distinguishing between dues "allocated for collective-bargaining purposes
and those earmarked for institutional expenses of the union." Detroit Mailers Union No.
40, 192 N.L.R.B. 951, 952, 78 L.R.R.M. 1053, 1054 (1971). So long as the dues are
"periodic and uniformly required and are not devoted to a purpose which would make
their mandatory extraction otherwise inimical to public policy," they can be required
under a union security clause and under NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). 192
N.L.R.B. at 952, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1054. But cf. Reid v. UAW Dist. Lodge 1093, 479 F.2d
517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973) (union does not violate duty of fair
representation by spending union dues on political campaigns, provided it maintains
rebate procedure to refund money to objecting employees).
This change is of no small significance. For example, in 1970 the International Typo-
graphical Union reported that only 17% of its dues was used for internal staff, bargain-
ing representatives, and legal expenses. The remainder went to union pensions, strike
benefits, training centers, public relations bureaus, and the union journal. BooK OF
LAws, ITU, Back Cover (1972).
135. BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 372-73 (1975).
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capital aggregation obviously varies from worker to worker, it cannot
be ignored in an analysis of whether to continue union membership.
2. Resignation and Employment Rights
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA provides that a union and an em-
ployer may negotiate a union security clause requiring "as a condi-
tion of employment membership [in the union] on or after the thirtieth
day following the beginning of such employment . . ... u3 This tol-
erance of union security clauses is qualified by § 14(b),'13 the "right
to work" section. It reads:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing
the execution or application of agreements requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any
State or Territory in which such execution or application is pro-
hibited by State or Territorial law.
Where a valid union security agreement has been negotiated between
a union and an employer, the dissident contemplating renunciation
of union "membership" is bound to ask: "Will the union security
provision empower the union, following my resignation, to demand
my discharge?" The short, and I would hope correct, answer is "No."
Under the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., "'membership' as a condition of employment" has been "whit-
tled down to its financial core."Ias So long as the resigner continues
to tender his dues he would appear to exhaust the demands of "mem-
bership" as defined by § 8(a)(3); his job would thus seem to be safe.
Yet some doubt remains, and neither the Board nor the Court has
done anything to dispel it, despite their recent emphasis on the right
to resign.
The doubt stems from a literal reading of § 8(a)(3), '0 which provides
that
no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee
for nonmembership in a labor organization . . . (B) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or
136. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
137. Id. § 164(b).
138. 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). As the Court further observed:
It is permissible to condition employment upon membership, but membership, insofar
as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon
payment of fees and dues.
Id.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee
to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly re-
quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership ....
Thus far, the Board and courts construing § 8(a)(3) have had no dif-
ficulty in limiting the worker's obligation to payment of dues. When
a union conditions membership on satisfaction of additional require-
ments-such as securing the endorsement of union members, passing
union tests, attending initiation ceremonies, or even swearing alle-
giance to the union140-it demands something more than "periodic
dues and the initiation fees uniformly required." The danger is that
this reasoning, reflecting the General Motors "gloss" on § 8(a)(3), may
not apply to the resigner. The union could argue that "membership"
in § 8(a)(3) means full-fledged membership, i.e., the satisfaction of
all the union's financial and nonfinancial membership requirements.
The union would concede that under § 8(a)(3)(B) the employer cannot
fire a worker whose "membership" the union has denied or terminated
for a reason other than the worker's failure to pay dues. But the
resigner's membership has not been "denied or terminated" by the
union: the worker severed the relationship on his own initiative.
One can imagine union officials arguing that they watched help-
lessly as a worker resigned and were now only exercising their rights
in demanding that the ill-advised employee be fired. 141 The union
might buttress its argument by reference to the ambiguous footnote in
Booster Lodge which suggested that the maintenance-of-membership
clause posed "no impediment to resigning" in that case only because
the contract had already expired. 1 42
These arguments, if accepted, would eviscerate the right to resign.
The Supreme Court in Booster Lodge should have stated plainly that
a resigner's employment rights are safeguarded by § 8(a)(3), provided
he tenders his dues. There is ample support for such a construction
of that section. Its legislative history, as the Court found in Radio
140. E.g., Bricklayers Union No. 4, 160 N.L.R.B. 1837, 1843, 63 L.R.R.M. 1204, 1205
(1966) (endorsement of union members); A. Nabakowski Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 876,57 L.R.R.M.
1105 (1964), enforced sub nor. NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 65, 359 F.2d 46 (6th
Cir. 1966) (union tests); Carpenters Local 824, 115 N.L.R.B. 518, 37 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1956)
(initiation ceremonies); Union Starch 9- Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779, 25 L.R.R.M. 1176 (1949),
enforced, 186 F.2d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951) (loyalty oath).
141. The union proffered this argument unsuccessfully in NLRB v. Hershey Foods
Corp., 513 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1975). The court held that in applying § 8(a)(3) it
was "'irrelevant whether the employee did or did not desire membership in the Union.'"
Id. at 1086 (quoting Local 749, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 343, 344-45
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973)).
142. See p. 1041 supra.
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Officers' Union v. NLRB, 143 indicates a clear congressional intent
"to prevent utilization of union security agreements for any purpose
other than to compel payment of union dues and fees.' u 4" Section
8(a)(3) was enacted to address the "free-rider" problem by allowing
unions to exact dues from nonmembers: "No other discrimination
aimed at encouraging employees to join, retain membership, or stay
in good standing in a union is condoned."' 145 Similarly, the General
Motors Court noted that, in explaining § 8(a)(3), Senator Robert A.
Taft compared it to Canadian law, which provided that an individual
had a right to be employed without joining the union so long as
he paid dues.146 This view of § 8(a)(3), grounded in legislative his-
tory, is confirmed by judicial interpretation. In their consideration
of workers who have refused to assume full union membership, the
courts have repeatedly emphasized that a worker has a right to be
employed provided he pays his dues. 147 In the case of an individual
who never consents to join the union, as in the case of an individual
who joins but later resigns, "membership" has not been denied or
terminated by the union. The courts have uniformly upheld the in-
dividual's employment rights in the former case, and the result should
be the same in the latter.
Any other construction of § 8(a)(3) makes nonsense of the resigna-
tion decisions. To suggest that the Supreme Court, in its Booster
Lodge footnote, was adding an unspoken "Of course, if you resign,
you will be fired," is to accuse it of the worst form of sophistry. More-
over, as a matter of federal labor policy, the conclusion that a worker
may not be discharged for resigning is consistent with the overriding
intent of both § 8(a)(3) and § 8(b)(1)(A) to separate employment
rights from union rights.14 Just as union discipline cannot be en-
forced by either actual or threatened job discrimination,' 49 it seems
143. 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 41-42.
146. 373 U.S. at 743 n.9. It must be noted, however, that there appears to have been
no legislative, consideration of the section's applicability to resigners. Even Senator Taft's
comment concerned an employee who had sought membership, but had been denied it
by the union. 93 CONG. REc. 4887 (1947).
147. E.g., Local 749, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 343, 345 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973); NLRB v. Zoe Chemical Co., 406 F.2d 574, 579 (2d
Cir. 1969).
148. See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 284 (1971); Radio Of-
ficers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
149. E.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-42 (1954) (union may not
penalize dues delinquency by loss of seniority); NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 17, 431
F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1970) (union may not seek worker's discharge for nonpayment of
fine); Local 167, Progressive Mine Workers v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 538 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
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clear that no union security clause, however broad, can justify dis-
charge of a former member who has resigned to escape union dis-
cipline, so long as he meets his minimal financial obligations.
C. Notice Problems and the Right to Resign
The preceding discussion has examined factors which are of cru-
cial importance to the individual who is in substantial disagreement
with union policy. If the dissident is to conduct an intelligent analysis
of the costs and benefits of continued union membership, he must be
fully informed. He must know precisely what is at stake should he
resign. Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that, at present, the
individual does not have adequate information to make an informed
decision.
The magnitude of this obstacle was demonstrated not long ago by
a case involving William F. Buckley, Jr.15° Mr. Buckley apparently
believed that his membership in a labor union constrained his not
insubstantial wit and might force him to compromise his often un-
popular views. Mr. Buckley wanted out; indeed, he later testified
that he had never wanted in.aal In seeking to establish that compul-
sory union membership infringed his rights, Mr. Buckley relied heavily
upon representations on the subject of resignation made to him by
union officials. He had been told that he could not limit his union
obligations to payment of dues and initiation fees; that resignation
would not alter his duty to respect picket lines and join nationwide
strikes; and that, if he resigned, his television shows could no longer
be broadcast in New York, California, or perhaps even abroad.5 2 He
had been told, in brief, that "the ultimate penalty for failing to re-
main a 'full-fledged' member would be his discharge from employ-
ment."1 53
Faced with these representations, Mr. Buckley was understandably
reluctant to resign from his union. His reluctance, we must expect,
is shared by many. At the outset, it should be noted that most union
security clauses fail to inform the worker that his statutory obligation
399 U.S, 905 (1970) (union may not deny job-related pension benefits after expelling
member for dual unionism); Local 43, Printing Pressmen, 202 N.L.R.B. 286, 82 L.R.R.M.
1638 (1973) (union may not remove worker from overtime lists for breaking union rules).
150. Evans v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd and remanded sub noa. Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio
Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
151. 354 F. Supp. at 834.
152. Id. at 836.
153. 496 F.2d at 312.
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is limited to payment of dues.5 4 This failure is hardly surprising.
Eighteen years ago, the Board suggested a "model" clause which also
failed to contain this information.15- There is little reason to believe
that the average worker, confronted with an over-inclusive union se-
curity clause, a silent union constitution, and ambiguous Supreme
Court statements will have the faintest glimmer of his right to im-
munize himself from union discipline.'1  Today, as in 1967 when Mr.
Justice Black first noted the problems inherent in the "full mem-
bership" concept, "[flew employees forced to become 'members' of
the union by virtue of the union security clause will be aware of the
fact that they must somehow 'limit' their membership to avoid the
union's court-enforced fines."'1 T And given that Mr. Buckley appar-
ently was misled as to his right to resign without losing his job, one
can imagine the plight of the many union members who pretend to
considerably less sophistication than does the editor of the National
Review.
Clearly, the Board and the courts must develop a mechanism to
ensure that only willing and informed members subject themselves
to the possibility of union discipline. The solution lies in disclosure.
Each worker should be informed about his legal obligations and rights
under a union security clause. Each union member should know that
he has a right to resign and that he must exercise this right to avoid
union discipline. He should know what the legal consequences of
that exercise are. Through disclosure the private decisionmakers will
154. See the representative union security clauses reprinted in 2 COLL. BARG. NrEoT.
& CONTR. (BNA) 87:61-63 (1976). An exception was the union security clause at issue in
General Motors. See 373 U.S. at 735 n.3 (maintenance of membership required "to the
extent of paying an initiation fee and the membership dues uniformly requiied as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership in the Union").
The only class of union security provision that notifies the worker of his limited
financial obligation is the agency shop clause. 2 COLL. B\Rc. N.or. & CONTR. (BNA)
87:121-23 (1976). In an agency shop, emplo)ees are not required to join the union, but
are required to pay a service charge equal to union dues. The agency shop exists as
the sole form of union security in approximately four percent of collective agreements.
2 COLL. BAR.. NrGoT. & CONTR. (BNA) 87:1 (1976).
155. See Keystone Coat, Apron : Towel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 880, 885, 42 L.R.R.M.
1456, 1458-59 (1958).
156. Gould, supra note 124, at 1108, suggests that the members' lack of knowledge
may lead "unscrupulous management" to attempt "union busting" by providing resigna-
tion information on a sub rosa basis. This fear, and its premise that the employer will
prove to be the employee's advisor of last resort, seems overstated. It is difficult to
imagine a large corporation risking the wrath of a firmly entrenched union by advising
prospective members that they need not assume the burdens of full membership or that
they may resign at any time. Where the employer does have something to gain by such
counseling, his actions may constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(l). Compare
NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 325 F.2d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 1963), with Martin Theatres
of Georgia, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 1054, 45 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1960).
157. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 215 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
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be furnished with the information requisite to intelligent decision-
making. Only through disclosure will private ordering work.
The state of the law at present is hostile to the approach I pro-
pose. This hostility, like many of the difficulties which confront union
dissidents, can be traced to Allis-Chalmers. The Court held that,
despite the existence of a union security clause, there was no indica-
tion that "any of the fined employees enjoyed other than full union
membership."' s Citing lAM v. Street,a59 the Court declared that full
membership should be presumed absent clear evidence to the con-
trary.'00 This presumption of full membership is implicitly endorsed
each time the Board or a court upholds a union fine without first
determining that the accused knew the minimal extent of his statu-
tory obligation. This presumption unfortunately suggests that unions,
at present, have no duty to inform members of their § 7 right to
refrain from full union membership. This presumption indicates
that, if the right to resign is to be made effective, we must move
beyond existing law.
Of course, the ideal solution, or at least the foundation of an ideal
solution, would be for Congress to rewrite the proviso to § 8(a)(3),
making explicit what is now inferred from legislative history and
buried in decisional law: that although a union may discipline its
full-fledged members, a worker cannot be forced to become such a
member.' But as such statutory tinkering is always difficult, the
Board and the courts should begin now, with the means available,
to develop a duty on the part of the union to differentiate between
committed members and mere dues-payers.
1. Moving Beyond Existing Law: The Role of the Courts
Since the courts are inclined to rely on the metaphor of contract
in enforcing union discipline,' 2 contract law seems a fair place to
begin in developing the union's duty to disclose. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court itself has suggested that contract theory may be rele-
158. Id. at 196.
159. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
160. 388 U.S. at 196-97.
161. Wording such as the following might be used:
Nothing in this subchapter shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment that each em-
ployee, on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment,
shall tender and shall continue to tender the periodic dues and reasonable initia-
tion fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership in
said labor organization.
162. See, e.g., NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 75-76 (1973); Scofield v. NLRB, 394
U.S. 423, 426 n.3 (1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 192 (1967).
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vant in this regard. In Granite State the Court forbade union dis-
cipline of resigners by reasoning that the union's power over its
members was "certainly no greater than the union-member con-
tract."'' 13 And in IAM v. Gonzales, 64 the Court, noting that the "con-
tractual conception of the relation between a member and his union
widely prevails in this country,"'105 upheld the authority of state courts
to interpret a union constitution as limiting the union's power of
expulsion.
The recognition that the "union-member contract" may limit union
disciplinary power forms the groundwork for a duty to disclose. State
courts should build upon this foundation. They should refuse to en-
force union discipline unless they find that the union's constitution
and bylaws explicitly warned members that such discipline was pos-
sible and that the members accepted that possibility in the finest
tradition of "offer and acceptance." In Glass Workers Local 18S v.
Seitz' 60 the Washington Supreme Court refused to enforce a fine after
discovering that the union's constitution and bylaws gave no express
warning that the union would seek judicial enforcement. Unfortu-
nately, the Seitz approach has not been followed in the few state de-
cisions involving union fines.1 7 If it were followed, the effect would
be devastating. Of the constitutions and bylaws of 13 major unions
studied, only three contained a warning that the union would attempt
to enforce its fines in court.0 3
The Seitz approach is valid so long as the courts insist on the meta-
phor of a union-member contract. Moreover, in this day of increasing
consumerism, we should ask whether the union-member relationship
can withstand scrutiny on "contract of adhesion" grounds.16Y When
163. NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 217
(1972).
164. 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
165. Id. at 618.
166. 65 Wash. 2d 640, 642, 399 P.2d 74, 75 (1965).
167. See, e.g., Local 248, UAV v. Natzke, 36 Wis. 2d 237, 251-52, 153 N.W.2d 602,
609-10 (1967).
168. The constitutions studied were those of the Teamsters, Machinists, Retail Clerks,
Auto Workers, Steelworkers, Carpenters, Communications Workers, Meatcutters, Ladies
Garment Workers, Laborers, Electrical Workers (IBEW), Typographical Workers, and
Mine Workers. Only the first three contained the desired warning. CONST., INT'L BRH. OF
TEMrsTERs, art. XXVI, § 1 (1971) (All financial obligations, including fines, "shall be
legal obligations of the members upon whom imposed and enforceable in a court of
law"); RULES OF ORDER FOR LOCAL LODGES, IAM, art. F, § 1 (1974) ("fines shall constitute
a legal liability" of member and "[c]ost of litigation arising from charges against a
member by reason of such liabilities shall constitute a legal debt" of member); CONST.,
RETAIL CLERKS INT'L ASS'N, § 31(I) (1972) ("[Alll financial obligations . . . shall be legal
obligations . . . enforceable in a court of law.")
169. See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts about Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. Rev. 629 (1943).
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we now require auto dealers to put warranty disclaimers in conspicuous
print and lending companies to emphasize their effective annual in-
terest rates, it seems bizarre to permit unions to obfuscate the poten-
tial liability of their members. Indeed, the argument for declaring
the union-member "contract" one of adhesion seems far stronger. In
the case of car dealers and loan companies, the consumer is free to
decline the offer. Only in the case of labor unions is there an ap-
parent legal compulsion-the over-inclusive security clause-to sign the
contract. To enforce fines as the product of that contract seems un-
fair where there is good reason to believe that the member was mis-
led into accepting the contract and was never warned, in even the
finest of print, that misbehavior could land him in court.
2. Moving Beyond Existing Law: The Role of the Board
Conditioning judicial enforcement of fines on a union's prior dis-
closure, through its constitution, of the possibility of such enforce-
ment would be a step in the right direction. But it would not go
nearly far enough in guaranteeing the worker's right to insulate him-
self from union discipline. The preemption doctrine, which states
that all actions arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, 70 would probably
limit state courts to denying enforcement of fines already assessed;
it appears they would have no legal power to prevent the initial im-
position of fines, however unenforceable. Yet even an unenforceable
fine may be coercive: "A man who is held up at gunpoint is coerced
whether or not the gun is loaded."' 71 More fundamentally, disclosure
that only makes members' legal liabilities explicit does not penetrate
to the heart of the problem: it fails to inform workers that they
need not become full members at all. To assure the dissemination
of this information is the responsibility of the Board.
First, the Board should prohibit, as a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A), any
170. The doctrine is explained in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 244 (1959):
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State pur-
ports to regulate arc protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or
constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment
requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate con-
duct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a
danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed
by state law.
Accord, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
171. Booster Lodge No. 405, ]AM, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 381, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004, 1005
(1970), modified, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd in part, 412 U.S. 84, and rev'd
in part sub non. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
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union security clause that does not explicitly limit the worker's obli-
gation to the payment of dues. The fact that workers are unlikely
to be aware of the General Motors gloss on more sweeping clauses
suggests that such a prohibition would significantly enhance the mem-
ber's understanding of the effects of resignation. The fact that a
number of major collective agreements function quite adequately
with such limited clauses' 7 2 suggests that the prohibition would not
significantly impair a union's right to organize.
Ample precedent in Board and court rulings supports this ap-
proach. A good example is the treatment of union security clauses
containing illegal preferential hiring provisions. 173 Unions often tried
to hedge their bets by including an addendum purporting to suspend
operation of the clause if these provisions were found illegal, thus
arguably rendering the clause valid on its face. The courts invali-
dated such clauses anyway.' 74 As the courts then appreciated, the
question was not whether the addendum contractually eliminated the
illegality of the union security clause: "the ordinary employee" would
not appreciate such legalisms..1  The question was whether the clause
as a whole was coercive, and the courts found that it was. As Judge
Augustus Hand explained, the very existence of an agreement promis-
ing preferential treatment for union members unfairly "tends to en-
courage membership in a labor organization."'"0
The same reasoning governs our problem. A union security clause
which simply requires "membership" will be of scant assistance to
"the ordinary employee," who is unlikely to appreciate the vastly dif-
ferent legal consequences that flow from "full-fledged membership"
as compared to "dues-paying membership." A union security clause
that requires membership without further advising that, under Gen-
eral Motors, it can demand no more than the payment of dues and
initiation fees unfairly encourages "full-fledged membership." It leaves
the worker ignorant of his less onerous alternative. For the reasons
expressed by Judge Hand, the Board should invalidate any union
172. See, e.g., Agreements between Ford Motor Co. and thc UAW, art. II, § I (Oct.
31, 1973); Agreement between General Motors and the UAW, § 4 (Nov. 19, 1973); Agree-
ments between the B.F. Goodrich Co. and the Rubber Workers and Rubber Workers
Local 5, art. vi, k l(a) (May 31, 1973) (all on file with Yale Law Journal).
173. Preferential hiring plans generally provide that an employer will hire only
union workers if available, or that he will give preference to workers who are already
union members. Such plans are invalid under NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1970), since they constitute employer "'discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment . . . to encourage . . . membership in [a] labor organization."
174. E.g., NLRB v. Local 1566, Int'l Longshoremen Ass'n, 278 F.2d 883 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 890 (1960).
175. Red Star Express Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 1952).
176. Id.
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security clause that does not expressly disclose to the worker the true
extent of his statutory obligation.
Secondly, the Board should hold that a union violates § 8(b)(1)(A)
when it disciplines a member who was not previously informed of
his right to limit his membership to the payment of dues and initiation
fees. Authority is available in the related area of discharges for non-
payment of dues. In Electrical Workers Frigidaire Local 801 v.
NLRB,277 then-Judge Warren Burger held that a union violates its
"fiduciary" duty when it seeks the discharge of a worker delinquent
in his dues who was not properly advised of his financial obligation
under the union security clause.178 A union, Judge Burger stated, is
"charged with an obligation of fair dealing, which includes the duty
to inform the employee of his rights and obligations so that [he] may
take all necessary steps to protect his job."17 9 In explaining the union's
duty, Judge Burger drew upon the law of agency:
A union may not treat as adversaries either its members or
those potential members whose continued employment is depen-
dent upon union membership. . . . The Union is the agent for
employees and as such "is subject to a duty to use reasonable
efforts to give his principal information which is relevant to af-
fairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the
principal would desire to have . .. .,,10
In adapting this concept of "fiduciary" duty to the resignation con-
text, the Board and the courts should consider both the relative harm
flowing from an ill-informed act and the relative probability that the
worker will be ill-informed. On the first count, it must be conceded
that discharge-the sanction for nonpayment of dues-is the most
severe penalty a union can exact; but a substantial fine, which a
worker cannot escape even by finding a new job, is far from trivial.
And on the second count, the case for requiring disclosure of the
limited nature of mandatory union membership seems far stronger
than that for requiring disclosure of the obligation to pay dues. A
poll of prospective employees would undoubtedly reveal that the vast
majority in union- or agency-shop industries are aware that they must
tender dues to keep their jobs. Those who are blissfully ignorant are
177. 307 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 936 (1962).
178. Id. at 683. Accord, NLRB v. Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 401 F.2d 509 (2d
Cir. 1968), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 394 U.S. 213 (1969); NLRB v. Hotel Em-
ployees Local 568, 320 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1963); Typographical Union Local 21, 218
N.L.R.B. No. 72, 89 L.R.R.M. 1733 (1975).
179. 307 F.2d at 683.
180. Id. (quoting RrsT,%TEMEtNr (SEcomD) OF Acr.cY § 381 (1958)).
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very likely to be enlightened by fellow workers or union officials.
By contrast, few workers are apt to realize that they need not assume
the burdens of full membership in order to work. Nor are they likely
to be so advised by fellow workers or union officials interpreting an
over-inclusive union security clause.
In sum, there is good reason to hold that a union violates a fidu-
ciary duty when it fails to inform a worker of his right to limit his
membership to payment of dues.' 8 ' If the union later disciplines the
worker who has not been so informed, especially if it extends its
sanctions beyond the internal union punishments of suspension and
expulsion, the case for a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) is compelling.
Thirdly, the Board should exercise its atrophied rulemaking powers
to assure that workers have the information they need for intelligent
decisions about union membership. At least since NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co.,182 it has been clear not only that the Board has the power
to make rules,18 3 but also that it is under an obligation to do so.IM The
resignation area seems an excellent place to start.
The goal of rulemaking should be to modify the Allis-Chalmers
presumption of full, voluntary membership'8 5-a presumption that
seems unrealistic, especially where union and employer negotiate a
broad union security clause. 18 By rulemaking, the Board could indi-
cate that the Allis-Chalmers presumption would apply if, and only if,
each individual who joins the union receives certain information. The
nature of this information undoubtedly can be guessed from what
181. It should also be noted that under § 105 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 415 (1970), unions have an affirmative obligation to explain to members their right-
regarding free speech, union elections, and the like. It would be strange if federal labor
policy should require that a worker be informed of his rights as a member, yet not
require that he be informed of his § 7 right to refrain from becoming a member in the
first place.
For a similar recommendation that unions be required to discharge their "fiduciary
responsibilities," see Seham, Limitations Upon and Directions of a Union's Right to
Discipline Its Members, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNiVERSITy 25TH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR 191, 201 (1973).
182. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
183. See NLRA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970), which provides:
The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in
the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.
184. 394 U.S. at 764-66. The Board frequently has been criticized for its refusal to
use the rulemaking procedures of the NLRA. See, e.g., Peck, The Atrophied Rule.
Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
185. See p. 1053 supra.
186. It should be noted that the Allis-Chalmers Court was construing a union security
clause that explicitly limited the member's obligation "to the extent of paying his
monthly dues .... " 388 U.S. at 196. Both the Board and future courts should, therefore,
consider open the present validity of a presumption of full membership where the union
security clause is not so limited.
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has gone before: Each worker should be told that he need not become
a good union member, that all he need do is tender periodic dues
and initiation fees. Each worker should be told that if he joins the
union he can be subject to union discipline and that such dis-
cipline may include court-enforced fines. Each worker should be told
that he is free to change his mind and resign from the union, and
he should be informed of the limitations on and costs of resignation.
Unless the union could demonstrate that the worker received this in-
formation, by pointing to an oath of allegiance 87 or a conspicuous
warning in its constitution or bylaws, the Allis-Chalmers presumption
should be reversed. While such "Miranda warnings" would 'be im-
possible to police in every instance, this rulemaking by the Board
would undoubtedly produce better informed workers and more re-
sponsible unions.
These proposals may strike some as drastic or anti-union. But they
may prove to be what the unions need to keep their disciplinary powers
intact. Union officials should be aware that Supreme Court opinions
are occasionally overturned and that, at the age of nine, Allis-Chalmers
hardly qualifies as hoary precedent. Academic commentators have
suggested that the Court's wisest course would be to reverse Allis-
Chalmers and start over from scratch.' 88 Whatever else my proposals
are, they are pro-individual. I believe in majority rule; but even more,
I am concerned that the laws should protect the dissenter. Laws should
help individuals help themselves, and that is really all disclosure
purports to do.
187. While union oaths of allegiance typically stress the member's duty to abide by
union rules and regulations, apparently none presently includes a disclaimer of either
actual or potential coercion. A model disclaimer might be: "I assume these obligations
voluntarily with full knowledge that I need not do so in order to retain employment."
188. See, e.g., T. KEELINE, supra note 48, at 95.
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